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“Cult of Equity”: Actuaries and the Transformation of 
Pension Fund Investing, 1948–1960 
 
This article examines the mid-twentieth-century transformation of U.K. 
pension fund investment policy known as the “cult of equity.” It focuses 
on the influence exercised by the Association of Superannuation and 
Pension Funds over actuarial and corporate governance standards, 
through actuaries who were members of its council. This intervention led 
to increasingly permissive actuarial valuations that reduced contributions 
for sponsors of pension funds investing in equities. Increased demand for 
equities required pension funds to adopt a more permissive approach to 
corporate governance than insurance companies and investment trusts, 
and contributed to declining standards of corporate governance. 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, there was an important shift in the investment policies of 
pension funds in the United States and United Kingdom, known as the “cult of equity.”1 
In the interwar period, pension funds invested almost exclusively in fixed income. 
However, by 1960, U.S. pension funds invested 40 percent of their assets in equities.
2
 
Similarly, U.K. pension funds increased the proportion of assets invested in equities from 
10 percent in 1945 to 47 percent in 1962.
3
 By 1993, U.S. and U.K. pension funds were 
investing around 50 percent and 81 percent, respectively, of their assets in equities.
4
 
A consequence of the cult of equity was that pension funds owned an increasing 
proportion of issued common shares. In 1993 in the U.K., institutional investors in total 
owned 62 percent of all equities, of which pension funds owned 31 percent.
5
 In the 
United States, comparable figures were 40 percent and 24 percent, respectively.
6
 
However, the pace of this change differed in the two countries, reflecting the excess of 
investment by institutional investors over the supply of new issues by corporations. 
Domestic U.K. institutional investors increased the proportion of equities that they owned 
from 17.9 percent in 1957 to 25.1 percent in 1963.
7
 In the U.S., broadly equivalent levels 
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of institutional investor ownership of equities were reached in around 1980, when 
domestic institutional investors owned 27 percent of all equities.
8
 
The mid-twentieth century also saw in both the U.S. and U.K. an increasing 
prevalence of hostile takeovers and the emergence of a market for corporate control.
9
 In 
both countries, managements attempted to repel hostile takeovers by issuing stock splits, 
raising dividends, and initiating public relations drives.
10
 However, antitakeover defenses 
that constituted more permissive standards of corporate governance developed at 
different times in the two countries. In the U.K., defense took the form of the issuance of 
nonvoting ordinary shares, a practice that peaked in the mid-1950s, when “seven percent 
of the market value of the industrial and commercial sector of the U.K. equity market 
took the form of ‘non-voting’ ordinary shares.”11 In contrast, in the U.S., where the 
issuance of nonvoting stock was banned on the NYSE, the poison pill takeover defense 
emerged in the early 1980s.
12
 
In both the U.S. and U.K., therefore, deterioration in the governance of 
antitakeover techniques, and in corporate governance more generally, approximately 
coincided with institutional investors owning around a quarter of issued ordinary shares. 
This coincidence between increasingly permissive corporate governance standards and 
increased ownership by institutional investors is puzzling since institutional investors 
have generally been understood to have invested in equities because of improved 
standards of governance and, subsequently, to have sought such improvement.
13
 The 
U.K. is particularly useful to understanding the relationship between equity investment 
by institutional investors and more permissive standards of governance, since U.K. rules 
relating to corporate governance have traditionally been determined through a self-
regulatory system by associations of institutional investors “behind the scenes.”14 In 
contrast, in the U.S., where collaboration among investors was prohibited, corporate 
governance rules were determined by case law.
15
 
In examining the governance aspects of the cult of equity in pension fund 
investment policy, this article suggests that pension funds adopted a more permissive 
approach to corporate governance than that adopted by other institutional investors, and 
that this contributed to deterioration in the rigor of corporate governance standards. 
Further, this article examines the influence exercised by pension fund managers upon the 
 3 
actuarial practices used to determine sponsoring firms’ contributions to the pension fund. 
While booming postwar markets, high corporate and personal tax rates, foreign exchange 
restrictions, and emergence of hostile takeovers contributed to the cult of equity, the role 
of actuarial practice in the determination of investment policy has been understudied.
16
 
Yet this was a seminal period in which consulting actuaries engaged for the first time 
with the financial aspect of actuarial practice and during which actuarial practices became 
more permissive. This essay identifies change in actuarial practice as a potential 
explanation of the transformation of pension fund investment policy, which is also 
consistent with the role of pension funds in promoting more permissive corporate 
governance standards. 
Pension funds’ influence over actuarial and corporate governance standards was 
exercised through the Association of Superannuation and Pension Funds (ASPF). The 
ASPF increasingly engaged in the determination of governance standards through a 
sequence of actuaries who were ASPF council members. These included Reginald 
Underwood, at the Liverpool and Victoria Friendly Society; Gordon Hosking, pension 
manager of Courtaulds; and most significantly, George Henry Ross Goobey, pension 
manager of the Imperial Tobacco pension fund. In 1955, Ross Goobey persuaded the 
trustees of Imperial Tobacco’s defined-benefit pension fund, one of the largest pension 
funds in the U.K., to adopt an idiosyncratic investment policy investing exclusively in 
equities.
17
 Due to the subsequently stellar performance of the pension fund, Ross Goobey 
acquired a reputation as “one of the most successful professional investors of all time” 
and, through his public advocacy of equity investment by pension funds, as the “father of 
the cult of equity.”18 This article examines Ross Goobey’s investment policy in the 
context of the debate on actuarial standards and corporate governance. It argues that Ross 
Goobey drew on the developments initiated by his predecessors, most notably Hosking, 
to bring to culmination the ASPF’s engagement in the setting of governance standards at 
this time. 
 
Defined-Benefit Pension Funds and Actuarial Practice 
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Defined-benefit pension funds promise the beneficiary a level of income in 
retirement that typically relates to his or her years in service and salary. These promises 
constitute the pension fund’s liabilities. The sponsoring firm makes contributions to the 
pension fund to ensure there are sufficient resources to pay pensions to beneficiaries at 
retirement. These contributions are invested and constitute the pension fund’s assets. The 
actuarial valuation compares the values of assets and liabilities to determine the pension 
fund’s level of funding and the sponsor’s contributions, and has two parts. The statistical 
part forecasts the magnitude of future payments to beneficiaries. The financial part 
selects a discount rate to assign a present value to these statistically estimated magnitudes 
and assigns a value to the assets. A defined-benefit pension fund is solvent when the 
market value of assets equals or exceeds the value of liabilities, where the discount rate 
used to value liabilities is the yield on risk-free assets such as government bonds. In such 
a circumstance the pension fund can be transferred from the sponsor to an insurance 
company without the need for additional sponsor contributions. Such a valuation restricts 
the discretion available to the actuary for selecting assumptions. Conversely, when the 
actuarial valuation enables the actuary to employ discretion in selecting assumptions, it is 
permissive. 
 
Interwar Pension Fund Governance and Investment Policy 
 
In the interwar period, the discount rate used to value pension fund liabilities 
reflected the expected rate of return on a pension fund’s assets. This was typically the 
risk-free interest rate and was based on the yield on the pension fund’s fixed income 
securities, adjusted to reflect an estimate of future interest rates.
19
 Further, if the sponsor 
provided a solvency or interest guarantee, or both, guaranteeing to make good any deficit 
or a shortfall in returns from its own resources, the discount rate was set at the sponsor’s 
guaranteed rate of return.
20
 This rate of return was regarded as the most independent 
estimate of the pension fund’s long-term return since, given that the sponsor had to make 
up any shortfall in returns from the guaranteed rate, it would not guarantee a rate of 
increase on the pension fund’s assets differing from its best estimate of that return. The 




 The actuarial valuation of pension funds sought to ensure the 
solvency of the pension fund, treating it as an insurance company.
22
 
The aim of pension fund investment policy was to achieve a yield on the portfolio 
exceeding the actuarial discount rate.
23
 However, if a high-risk investment policy was 
adopted—for example, investing in equities—in the absence of a durable and 
demonstrable competitive advantage to investing in riskier assets, the actuary protected 
the solvency of the pension fund by reducing the value of assets or increasing the value of 
liabilities. Funds investing in riskier assets were therefore penalized in that unrealized 
gains were not reflected in lower contributions. Actuarial practice enforced a focus on 
fixed income as the most appropriate asset class for pension funds and insurance 
companies. 
The need to maintain a sufficiently high investment income to meet guarantees 
led—in response to the low long-term interest rates in the “cheap money” era following 
the 1929 financial crash—to an incremental broadening in the range of investments 
adopted by pension funds toward higher-risk corporate securities, such as debentures, 
preference shares, and equities. Pension funds such as the Rowntrees fund, managed by 
Sam Clayton and then by Frank Comer, sought higher returns by adopting an “active 
investment policy,” which combined investment in riskier assets with market timing 
techniques.
24
 There was a similar shift among insurance companies, including by John 
Maynard Keynes as chairman of the National Mutual Insurance Company.
25
 
The marginally increasing risk profile of institutional investors’ investment policy 
led to a concentration on standards of financial-market governance in two ways. First, 
actuarial publications increasingly focused on the long-term returns available from equity 
investment, reflecting an emergent attention to the financial rather than the statistical 
aspect of actuarial work.
26
 Second, institutional investors began to negotiate collectively 
with issuers of securities and their merchant banks regarding securities restructurings. 
The term for this activity was “investment protection.” In 1932, the British Insurance 
Association (BIA) established an Investment Protection Committee (IPC).
27
 Also in 
1932, the Association of Investment Trusts (AIT) was established, with the primary 
purpose of coordinating investment protection by investment trusts.
28
 These associations 
sought to increase the influence exercised by their members by acting collectively in 
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negotiations with securities issuers. In exercising such collective influence, investment 
protection committees had to reconcile potential conflicts between members investing in 
different securities, such as senior and junior debt securities and preferred and common 
equity of the same issuer.
29
 Investment protection committees viewed the application of 
the “principles of sound finance” in adjudicating between the claims of the securities 
holders as key to reaching cooperation.
30
 
Investment protection committees achieved fairness by working through case 
committees. Case committees were composed of members who had invested in an 
issuer’s security. The committee first assessed whether members held a significant 
enough proportion of the issuer’s securities to make intervention worthwhile. Then the 
committee would suggest a course of action for the association’s members. In the 
interwar period, investment protection committees dealt primarily with the restructuring 
of defaulted fixed-income securities issued by international governments and public 
authorities. As London’s dominance over international banking declined in the postwar 
period, and the City’s focus shifted toward the financing of domestic industry, these 
associations increasingly engaged with domestic corporate management in contexts that 
included financial distress, corporate reorganization, and new issues.
31
 There was a shift 
toward committees making recommendations based on negotiations with issuers in 
advance of any formal proposal. 
In contrast to the BIA and AIT, the ASPF was initially inactive with respect to 
investment protection. The ASPF was founded in 1923 following successful lobbying by 
a group of treasurers and pension managers for tax exemptions granted in the 1921 
Finance Act.
32
 The ASPF consequently considered its primary mission to be harnessing 
the collective strength of pension funds to lobby for favorable legislation. Additionally, 
pension funds were not run by investment experts, and in contrast with the BIA and AIT, 
the ASPF had a large and heterogeneous membership, further complicating coordination. 
As a result, the ASPF council saw investment protection services as conflicting with its 
mission. Lack of engagement by the ASPF meant that corporate governance standards 
were determined by insurance companies and investment trusts. 
 
Postwar Divergence in Actuarial and Corporate Governance Practices 
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In the postwar period, standards relating to the actuarial valuation of insurance 
companies and pension funds, and the investment policies of insurance companies and 
pension funds, began to diverge, with consequences for standards of corporate 
governance.  First, papers were published on the financial aspect of practices relating to 
pension fund actuarial valuation.
33
 In 1948, Colin Puckridge, an actuary and assistant 
secretary at the Prudential insurance company, published a paper that was the first to 
discuss the financial assumptions used within the actuarial valuation of pension funds, 
proposing that the value of pension fund assets be determined by discounting their future 
income.
34
 Following prewar practice, the discount rate reflected the expected investment 
return. However, increasingly, if a pension fund invested in equities, the discount rate 
now reflected the expected long-term equity return. Adopting a discount rate that 
included a risk premium and exceeded the risk-free rate had the consequence that the 
actuarial valuation recognized in advance the expected future outperformance of equities 
over fixed income. This approach to determining the funding level of a pension fund 
reduced the value of liabilities below the level required for the actuarial valuation to seek 




Second, with growing investment in corporate securities, pension funds 
increasingly required investment protection services. Nevertheless, the ASPF declined to 
establish an investment protection committee or to organize investment protection for its 
members, instead dealing with members’ investment enquiries in a cursory, formulaic, 
and unhelpful fashion.
36
 In 1947, to deepen the financial expertise of the ASPF council 
(which had been composed primarily of lawyers and secretaries), R. E. Underwood, 
MBE—past president of the Institute of Actuaries, actuary at the Liverpool and Victoria 
Friendly Society, and author of an actuarial textbook—was elected to the ASPF council.37 
However, Underwood was a traditionalist in actuarial matters and did not initiate change 
at the ASPF. Ross Goobey would critique Underwood’s conventional actuarial approach 
at the 1950 ASPF conference.
38
 In 1949 another actuary, Gordon Hosking, joined the 
ASPF council.
39
 Hosking had qualified as an actuary in 1930 and then worked at the 
Prudential insurance company. In 1946, Hosking had made the rare career move for an 
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actuary of becoming a pension manager, by joining the Courtaulds pension fund, while 
also working as an independent part-time consulting actuary.
40
 Hosking coauthored the 
standard textbook on pension fund management, in which he advocated a relatively 
aggressive allocation of 40 percent of a large pension fund’s portfolio to equities.41 
Hosking initiated two modernizing initiatives within the ASPF. First, he advanced 
the ASPF’s communication with its members—despite opposition by John Mitchell, the 
association’s cofounder—by introducing “occasional papers” that evolved into 
Superannuation, the ASPF’s journal, in 1952.42 Second, in 1950, Hosking revived 
discussions relating to the establishment of an investment protection committee.
43
 
Hosking consulted with the BIA IPC on its procedures and collaborated with pension 
managers whose investment background complemented his own.
44
 The first was Francis 
Andrews, investment manager at the Unilever pension fund. In 1955, Andrews would 
cofound the Society of Investment Analysts.
45
 The second was H. W. Naish, director of 
establishments (finance) at the Coal Board. On establishment of the Coal Board’s pension 
fund, at the request of the Bank of England, two representatives from the AIT were 
invited to serve as advisors.
46
 The Coal Board pension fund was consequently a public-
sector pension fund that was relatively active with respect to investment protection. The 
third was the pension manager of Esso Petroleum. However, since the ASPF council was 
reluctant to set recommendations regarding investment protection, it neither established 
an investment protection committee nor, as the BIA had done, hired Price Waterhouse to 
provide the relevant administrative services.
47
 Instead, the ASPF introduced a trial 




Demand for investment protection soon led to calls, including from Naish at the 
Coal Board, for ASPF engagement in investment protection. In response, the ASPF 
council declined again to establish an investment protection committee and established 
instead a decentralized “investment cooperation service.”49 This service was managed by 
the ASPF’s secretary and assistant secretary, the former based at the ASPF’s 
headquarters and the latter working at the Unilever pension fund.
50
 Again, no 
recommendations were made. Rather, the ASPF secretary held the list of investments of 
pension funds participating in the service. Pension funds seeking to engage the issuer of a 
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security could notify the secretary who would establish contact with other pension funds 
owning the issuer’s securities. These pension funds would collectively consider whether 
and how to engage with the issuer.
51
 Around 120 pension funds indicated interest in this 
service, and sixty provided their investment list.
52
 The BIA and AIT consented to 
cooperate with the ASPF, including by allowing pension funds to participate in their case 
committees and receive their recommendations.
53
 In return, the ASPF proposed to 
contribute to the BIA IPC’s expenses.54 Nevertheless, identity of interest with the BIA 
was not assumed. Hosking noted that the ASPF may make decisions that are “against” 
the BIA IPC’s recommendations.55 
An example of such differences and of the ASPF’s more permissive approach 
relates to preference shareholders’ rights, which in the immediate postwar period was the 
primary investment protection concern of the BIA and AIT. Insurance companies and 
investment trusts sought to protect their preference share investments in cases where 
common shareholders made decisions that impacted the value of preference shares 
without the consent of preference shareholders.
56
 Practices generating concern included 
redemption of preference shares at inequitable prices, nonpayment of preference 
dividends, and “a considerable number” of issues of common stock diluting the 
proportion of the vote controlled by preference shareholders.
57
 In protecting preference 
shareholders, the BIA initiated legal proceedings, hired counsel to check the feasibility of 
changing company law, and, with the AIT, lobbied the London Stock Exchange for 
amendments to rules relating to the disclosures of preference shareholders’ rights in 
prospectuses.
58
 The BIA also developed—but then did not promulgate—a code of rights 
for new issues of preference shares.
59
 In contrast, since pension funds held less preferred 
stock and invested more and more in equities, the ASPF was less concerned with 
protecting preference shareholders. 
 
The Equities-Only Investment Policy at the Imperial Tobacco Pension Fund 
 
The distinctive approach to governance adopted by the ASPF was implemented 
most emphatically by George Ross Goobey. Ross Goobey had enrolled as an actuarial 
student in 1930, qualifying in 1941.
60
 During these eleven years, he pursued sporting 
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ambitions and also worked, mainly at various small and mid-sized life and general 
insurance companies in investment, at a time when it was atypical for an insurance 
company actuary to conduct investment work.
61
 Between 1934 and 1936, he worked at 
the Legal and General Assurance Society, whose actuary Harold Raynes advocated 
equity investment for insurance companies.
62
 Ross Goobey would later draw on Raynes’s 
work to advocate an equity investment policy for pension funds.
63
 In 1947, Ross Goobey 




Imperial Tobacco, which was formed from the merger of thirteen British tobacco 
firms, had been making unfunded pension arrangements for its employees in the early 
twentieth century.
65
 In 1929 the company formalized these arrangements by establishing 
a contributory pension fund.
66
 R. J. Sinclair, Imperial’s company secretary, participated 
in establishing the pension fund and administered it along with Imperial Tobacco’s chief 
accountant, who managed the investments.
67
 At the pension fund’s inception, Imperial 
Tobacco committed to a 5 percent interest guarantee.
68
 This guaranteed rate, around 1 
percent higher than government bond yields, reflected the adoption of an aggressive 
investment policy that attempted to cheapen pension provision for Imperial Tobacco. 
However, low interest rates in the interwar and early postwar periods caused the yield of 
the pension fund’s assets to fall below 5 percent, triggering the need for additional 
sponsor contributions at each quinquennial actuarial valuation.
69
 In the attempt to procure 
a yield that could meet the sponsor guarantee, the portfolio had been diversified into 
corporate securities. From 1933 there was a declining allocation to U.K. government 
bonds, known as “gilts,” and increasing investment in corporate bonds, preference shares, 
and equities. Thus, in contrast with narratives in which the pension fund was “almost 
exclusively” or “predominantly” invested in gilts when Ross Goobey joined the fund, it 
was invested half in gilts, 10 percent in corporate fixed income, 20 percent in preference 
shares, and 20 percent in equities.
70
 
This relatively sophisticated investment policy implies that Imperial Tobacco was 
a supportive environment for Ross Goobey’s ideas about investment. Ross Goobey also 
received encouragement from three individuals. First, Sir James Grigg, nonexecutive 
director of Imperial Tobacco, trustee of its pension fund, and chairman of its investment 
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committee, supported Ross Goobey’s investment policy.71 Grigg had previously worked 
as chairman of the board of the Inland Revenue and as nonexecutive director of the 
Prudential Assurance Company and the National Provincial Bank.
72
 Second, Imperial 
Tobacco’s chief accountant, who was a prominent member of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of England and Wales, urged Ross Goobey to volunteer to join the ASPF 
council and participate in discussions relating to standards and best practice.
73
 Third, in 
1951, fellow actuary Randall Haigh joined Ross Goobey at Imperial Tobacco from the 
Equity & Law insurance company.
74
 
In common with traditional practice, Ross Goobey conceived of the objective of 
pension fund investment policy as seeking to achieve a yield exceeding the actuarial 
discount rate.
75
 The yield of each security was compared to this benchmark.
76
 Asset 
allocation was determined by the relative availability of investments with a sufficiently 
high yield within each asset class.
77
 Investing solely in equities reflected the fact that in 
the early 1950s the dividend yield of the shares of large companies was 4.3 percent, 
compared with a yield on U.K. government gilts of around 3 percent.
78
 This income 
differential would be further increased by judicious selection of investments and by 
increasing dividends.
79
 In seeking diversification, the pension fund invested in as many as 
a thousand equity securities.
80
 Rising equity markets and the decline in the yield of large 
capitalization stocks below that of gilts in 1959 led Ross Goobey to invest in higher 
yielding mid-sized and small companies’ stocks and private equity.81 He also pioneered 
pension fund investment in property.
82
 With the focus on maximizing income, in the 
early 1970s, when the yield of gilts exceeded the dividend yield of equities by around 5 
percent, Ross Goobey invested in fixed-income securities.
83
 
Under Ross Goobey’s management the value of the pension fund’s assets 
increased from £12 million in 1947 to £20 million in December 1954, £35 million in 
October 1958, and £75.9 million in April 1961.
84
 Assuming that the sponsor’s and 
beneficiaries’ net contributions totaled £1.25 million annually between December 1954 
and 1961, the value of the pension fund’s assets increased by approximately 270 percent 
over the period that Ross Goobey had permission to invest the pension fund exclusively 





Ross Goobey, the ASPF, and Actuarial Practice 
 
Ross Goobey’s equity-only investment policy was also developed with the 
objective of challenging actuarial and corporate governance standards. At the 1949 
actuarial valuation, to align Imperial Tobacco’s sponsor guarantee with prevailing rates 
of return, the guarantee was reduced from 5 to 4 percent.
86
 Consistent with this lower 
expected return, Imperial Tobacco’s trustees did not permit Ross Goobey to increase the 
equity allocation. To increase the portfolio’s yield, Ross Goobey ceased purchases of 
gilts and purchased preference shares instead of corporate bonds.
87
 He was permitted to 
opportunistically invest more in equities in 1952, when the market receded.
88
 The equity 
allocation reached 28 percent in early 1953.
89
 In October 1953, Ross Goobey 
recommended the exclusively equity-oriented investment policy to the Imperial Tobacco 
trustees.
90
 In rejecting his proposal and seeking to avoid selling fixed-income holdings at 
a loss, the trustees agreed only to invest all new contributions in equities and property.
91
 
The trustees’ decision is understandable given that less than a third of the pension fund 
was allocated to equities, and as discussed further below, suggests that Ross Goobey 
considered criteria that were not directly related to the investment of the Imperial 
Tobacco pension fund when recommending the equity-only investment policy.  
Around this time, in January 1953 and July 1953, Ross Goobey was nominated 
and then elected to the ASPF council.
92
 He replaced Underwood, who was retiring and 
“wished to make way for a younger man.”93 Shortly after, assisted by his team at Imperial 
Tobacco and liaising with the ASPF’s assistant secretary, Ross Goobey took charge of 
the ASPF’s investment cooperation service.94 This remarkable appointment was 
indicative of the ASPF’s distinctive approach to corporate governance relative to the BIA 
and AIT. For example, possession of confidential information required BIA and AIT case 
committee members not to trade securities during ongoing negotiations with an issuer, 
but the ASPF had little means of monitoring Ross Goobey in this respect.
95
 Further, in 
contrast with the incremental and transparent consultation process characterizing the 
establishment of the service by Hosking, and with the procedural formalities of the BIA 
IPC and AIT, the ASPF council informed its membership of its arrangement with Ross 
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Goobey only following other pension managers’ complaints that Ross Goobey’s 
involvement provided him with an unfair informational advantage.
96
 
Nevertheless, delegation of the investment cooperation service to Ross Goobey 
presented various advantages for the ASPF. First, he contributed free investment 
expertise. By 1955, the team at Imperial Tobacco was processing information on more 
than twelve thousand investments of 116 pension funds.
97
 Second, the ASPF sought the 
necessary flexibility to pursue governance objectives that might conflict with those of 
insurance companies and investment trusts. Consequently, it did not wish to issue 
recommendations.
98
 Unlike Hosking, who was a part-time consulting actuary, and Price 
Waterhouse, Ross Goobey had no commitments relating to the provision of professional 
advice and could act discretely and flexibly in pursuing such a policy. 
Third, as a qualified actuary Ross Goobey could credibly participate in the debate 
on actuarial practice in such a way that would promote the interests of the ASPF and its 
members. In late 1953 and early 1954, there was escalating client opposition, led by local 
authority pension funds, to conservative actuarial practice. The 1954 Bedfordshire 
County Council parliamentary bill sought to eliminate the actuarial valuation of local 
authority pension funds and to pay for local authority pensions from local taxation on a 
pay-as-you-go basis.
99
 A legislative failure, the Bedfordshire Bill nonetheless succeeded 
in initiating discussion between the Institute of Actuaries and the Association of 
Municipal Corporations regarding actuarial practice, focused initially on statistical and 
then on financial assumptions.
100
  It thereby illustrated the need for actuarial expertise in 
engaging in debate regarding actuarial practice.   
Moreover, as the manager of the Imperial Tobacco pension fund, Ross Goobey 
was personally involved in such debate.  Shortly after the bill failed, Ross Goobey wrote 
to the Imperial Tobacco pension fund trustees to report his discussions with the actuary 
John Gunlake regarding the discount rate to be used in the 1954 actuarial valuation.
101
 
Gunlake had rejected Ross Goobey’s request that the discount rate reflect the high yield 
achieved by investing in equities. Instead, adopting the traditional method, Gunlake 
offered to raise the discount rate to 4.25 percent if Imperial Tobacco increased its 
guarantee from 4 to 4.25 percent.
102
 This proposed compromise produced a small surplus, 
eliminating the need for deficit payments, but did not cede to Ross Goobey’s request that 
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In late 1954, at the ASPF council, Ross Goobey circulated a memorandum 
distinguishing between the appropriate investment policies for insurance companies and 
pension funds; in early 1955, he published it in Superannuation.
104
 He argued that, in 
contrast with insurance companies, pension funds had longer dated, irredeemable, 
inflation-linked liabilities and therefore required investments potentially retaining their 
long-term real value. He also argued that pension funds could establish a sinking fund 
from extra income to protect against losses arising from bankruptcy without paying tax 
and that, since pension funds were smaller than insurance companies, they were less 
constrained by illiquidity. Moreover, he asserted that pension funds, unlike insurance 
companies, did not have to make annual solvency disclosures potentially adversely 
impacting the sponsor’s financial accounts.105 In this way Ross Goobey contended that 
contrasting actuarial practices were appropriate for insurance companies and pension 
funds. Following this publication, the ASPF council requested that he write a 
memorandum on investment for the 1956 ASPF conference. Over the eighteen months 
prior to its publication in the spring of 1956, Ross Goobey reworked the 1954 article, 
incorporating comments from ASPF council members and other investment experts.
106
 
Concurrently, in August 1955, he reiterated to the Imperial Tobacco trustees his 
recommendation to invest entirely in equities, receiving approval at the end of 1955.
107
 
There are several indications that Ross Goobey’s recommendation to invest 
entirely in equities was not concerned solely with investment performance. First, his 
articles and recommendations to the trustees recycle text, suggesting that he viewed the 
internal and external arguments relating to equity investment as linked. For example, he 
did not discuss in print how much a pension fund should allocate to equities before his 
recommendation to invest entirely in equities had received the trustees’ consent. Second, 
following that consent, the pension fund allocated 46 percent to equities, 27 percent to 
preference shares, 10 percent to gilts, 8 percent to corporate bonds, and the balance to 
cash.
108
 Since a more incremental change to the investment policy would have sufficed 
for investment purposes, this suggests that Ross Goobey had other considerations in 
mind. Third, following the trustees’ decision, the allocation to equities increased slowly, 
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rising to 68 percent in June 1957, 85 percent in October 1958, and 96 percent in April 
1961.
109
 Fourth, although only approximately two-thirds of the portfolio was invested in 
equities, Ross Goobey drew on the trustees’ permission to advocate an equity-only 
investment policy at the ASPF’s 1956 autumn conference.110 By publicly advocating 
equity investment, Ross Goobey potentially made certain securities—those that 
Imperial’s pension fund needed to acquire—more expensive, suggesting again the 
salience of considerations other than those relating to investment. 
Thus, permission to invest exclusively in equities enabled Ross Goobey to 
publicly demonstrate the benefits of transgressing traditional, conservative actuarial 
investment practice. More explicitly, he also supported new actuarial valuation 
techniques, emphasized how investment policy might influence the selection of discount 
rate in actuarial valuations, critiqued traditional actuarial practice for ignoring inflation, 
and mocked actuarial practice that eliminated actuarial discretion for treating actuaries as 
mere “calculating machines.”111 He also argued against pension fund financial accounting 
that would reduce actuarial discretion.
112
 In 1960, as respondent to Gunlake, who was 
speaking as the first consulting actuary to have been elected president of the Institute of 
Actuaries, Ross Goobey exposed Gunlake’s actuarial valuation of the Imperial Tobacco 
pension fund to public ridicule, signaling the emergence of a generation of consulting 




Ross Goobey, the ASPF, and the Market for Corporate Control 
 
Adoption by pension funds of an equity-oriented investment policy also led to 
these funds engaging with the market for corporate control in distinctive ways. Insurance 
companies participating in the first hostile takeovers in the early 1950s provided debt 
financing to entrepreneurs conducting the takeovers, which was repaid by selling the 
acquired companies’ properties, perhaps to the insurance companies, and leasing those 
properties back.
114
 Entrepreneurs involved in such takeovers, such as Charles Clore and 
Isaac Wolfson, provided insurance companies with access to high-yielding, high-quality 
mortgage and real estate investments.
115
 In contrast to insurance companies, pension 
funds sought equity participation in such ventures, making equity returns even scarcer. 
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The “heavy increase in the issue of non-voting shares” and increasingly unequal 
treatment of shareholders of the acquired firms within takeovers in the mid-1950s 
enabled entrepreneurs to simultaneously accommodate the need of pension funds to 
invest in equity while retaining control.
116
 Nonvoting shares thus facilitated rather than 
constrained hostile takeovers, albeit in a self-limiting fashion, and represented the 




The ASPF’s permissive approach to corporate governance thus undermined the 
coalitions through which the BIA and AIT investment protection committees upheld high 
standards of corporate governance. In contrast with the BIA and AIT, the ASPF did not 
inform companies issuing nonvoting shares of its opposition to this practice.
118
 In 1955 
the BIA initiated a collective appeal by the three associations to the London Stock 
Exchange, seeking that it follow the New York Stock Exchange in banning nonvoting 
common stock.
119
 The ASPF adopted the most permissive approach of the three 
associations.
120
 The ASPF did not participate in the AIT’s initiative, conducted jointly 
with the BIA, to lobby the London Stock Exchange to ban nonvoting shares.
121
 The BIA 
and AIT, but not the ASPF, participated in a working party convened by the Bank of 
England in 1959, setting guidelines regarding the market for corporate control.
122
 In 
describing cooperation with the ASPF, the secretary to the BIA IPC, L. W. Kempe, 
remarked, “The experience has not been good.”123 
The ASPF initiated some formalization of its procedures relating to corporate 
governance in 1957, when the ASPF council created the role of “organizing secretary” at 
Unilever, paying for services rendered.
124
 However, procedures for collecting data on 
pension funds’ holdings, developed by the organizing secretary with assistance from the 
BIA IPC, were abandoned, again indicating a rejection of the BIA IPC’s formal 
approach.
125
 It was on this informal basis that in 1960 the organizing secretary and ASPF 
council, assisted by Ross Goobey, initiated the formation of an investment protection 
committee.126 The ASPF IPC, which was established in 1963, had a membership of 
approximately forty pension funds.  The great majority of these pension funds were 
sponsored by employers in the private sector.
127
 At this point, Ross Goobey withdrew 
from the ASPF’s corporate governance activities. Haigh represented Imperial Tobacco on 
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the ASPF IPC rather than Ross Goobey.
128
 Ross Goobey also relinquished the actuarial 
role within Imperial Tobacco’s pension fund to Haigh but retained responsibility for 
investment of the pension fund.
129
 He subsequently was president of the National 




TIAA-CREF: A U.S. Parallel 
 
Although R. Minturn Sedgwick in the U.S. suggested that pension funds invest 
exclusively in equities and American actuarial practice also became more permissive in 
the 1950s, debate in the U.S. Society of Actuaries on defined-benefit pension fund 
investment policy dismissed the idea of investing a pension fund only in equities.
131
 
Instead, the variable annuity, developed by Dr. William C. Greenough, founder and 
subsequently president and chairman of the College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF), 
was the exclusively equity-oriented retirement vehicle that was discussed. CREF, 
established as a New York insurance company in 1952, provided an equity-based 
alternative to the traditional annuities available to policyholders of the Teachers 
Insurance and Annuities Association of America (TIAA), established by the Carnegie 
Foundation in 1918. In contrast to traditional annuity guarantees, against which the 
insurer invested in fixed-income securities, CREF invested entirely in equities and so 
increased the risk relating to the level of retirement income but also raised its potential 
level. Policyholders could determine the level of risk associated with their retirement 
income through their allocation to TIAA or CREF. 
In common with Imperial Tobacco, CREF exploited the high yield available on 
stocks relative to bonds. However, in contrast to Imperial Tobacco, CREF sought 
increased rigor in actuarial and corporate governance practice. Designed as a defined-
contribution arrangement providing annuitized retirement income, the CREF variable 
annuity equated the value of liabilities with the market value of assets so that fluctuations 
in asset values could not generate insolvency.
132
 Additionally, CREF developed a socially 
responsible investment policy and opposed the development of the poison pill in 
takeovers.
133
 CREF thus pursued improved actuarial standards and corporate governance 





This article examines the transformation of British pension fund investment 
policy in the mid-twentieth century known as the “cult of equity.” It finds that pension 
funds sought more permissive actuarial and corporate governance standards at this time. 
In explaining the role of governance in pension funds’ change of policy, the article 
highlights the seminal shift in actuarial thinking in which actuaries began to focus upon 
the financial aspect of actuarial practice. Actuaries emerged as financial and investment 
experts within stockbrokerage firms, actuarial consultancies, and pension funds. 
Concurrently, the ASPF increasingly developed a permissive approach to actuarial 
practice and corporate governance through a succession of actuaries who were its council 
members, including Underwood, Hosking, and Ross Goobey. Ross Goobey both 
managed the ASPF’s investment protection service and implemented an equity-only 
investment policy at the Imperial Tobacco pension fund that played a role in influencing 
actuarial practice. 
In the late 1940s actuarial valuations began to include an equity-risk premium 
within the actuarial discount rate used to determine the value of pension funds’ liabilities. 
This lowered sponsor contributions for pension funds investing in equities and increased 
the attractiveness of equities as an asset class for pension funds.
134
 Conversely, the 
increased rigor of actuarial practice over the past fifteen years, associated with the 
promulgation of fair-value pension fund financial accounting standards, has been argued 
to contribute to the “de-risking” and reallocation of pension portfolios to fixed income.135 
The determination of corporate governance standards by U.K. institutional 
investors through means such as investment protection committees had two further 
consequences. First, this context enabled private-sector pension funds, such as Imperial 
Tobacco, to dominate public-sector pension funds, such as the Coal Board, and mute their 
activism. Consequently, public-sector pension funds were less engaged in setting 
corporate governance standards in the U.K. than in the U.S., where the absence of 





Second, since pension funds adopted a permissive approach to corporate 
governance, private investors in the U.K. were more willing to issue shares in their firms 
without retaining a block holding and thus accepted greater risk of a hostile takeover than 
private investors were willing to accept in the United States.
137
 British owners of firms 
understood, correctly, that the pension funds that owned shares in their firms would only 
partially enforce shareholders’ objectives in hostile takeovers. Actuaries played an 
important role in facilitating the confidence displayed by private investors at this time. 
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